Pension reform in Latin America : quick fixes or sustainable reform? by Aiyer, Sri-Ram
fW4s  (m 5
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1865
Pension Reform  Countries in Latin  America
have been ahead of countries
in Latin America  elsewhere in undertaking the
transition from pay-as-you-go
Quick  Fixes or Sustainable Reform?  defined-benefit  pension  plans
Quick  Fixes  or  Sustainable  Reform?  to fully  funded,  defined-
contribution pension plans.
Sri-Ram Aiyer  Now they must  address






















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1865
Summary findings
Because of better health and higher standards of living,  workers on which contributions are calculated, or
people are living longer. By 2030, more than 16 percent  changes in the structure of benefits.
of the world's population will be older than 60,  Countries in Latin America have been ahead of other
compared with 9 percent today.  regions in undertaking major reform from pay-as-you-go
As a result, pension systems  will need reform. Most  defined-benefit pension plans to fully funded, defined-
current systems have substantial unfunded liabilities that  contribution pension plans. Because of the successful
will impose significant financial burdens on future  Chilean pension model, a notable number of Latin
generations without providing adequate protection for  American countries have undertaken deep pension
older individuals and lower-income workers.  reform. Aiyer highlights reform efforts in a sample of
Pension reform is inevitable because of demographic  countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
imperatives and because many pension systems are  Vigilance is still needed, says Aiyer. Effective oversight
financially unsustainable. Unfunded public pension  is essential, and so is complementary reform in the
systems pose political risk if promises to future retirees  banking, insurance, and securities markets. In capital
cannot be met. Pension reform is both technically and  markets, for example, regulation must be strengthened
politically complex but more and more countries are  and the requirement that pension fund investments be
beginning to address the problem. The question is  made only in government-related  securities must be
whether quick fixes will be adopted or sustainable  eliminated. New types of insurance must be made
changes that will benefit the macroeconomy and protect  available and there must be increased competition among
elderly and lower-income citizens.  insurance providers.
Quick fixes - typical in many economies - generally  More work must be done but the region's pension
involve changes in eligibility (such as retirement age),  systems have started on the right course.
changes in the rate of contribution or the population of
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INTRODUCTION
Most formal pension systems  worldwide are publicly  managed.  They pay defined benefits and
depend on taxing a portion of worker's earnings. The pension systems  are financed  by payroll  taxes on a
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Today's workers are taxed to pay the pensions of those who have already
retired.  Social security systems  have frequently  been justified on the basis that they promote equity and
redistribute  income. Yet virtually  all countries  in the world need to reform their public pension systems.
In many developed and transition  economies,  pension systems  display  a high expenditure  level, and despite
high contributions, often have high and rising fiscal  imbalances. In many developing  countries, pension
programs are often  unequal, actuarially  unsound,  and the financing  is distortionary.
A number of countries in the Latin American region have been reassessing  their pension policies
because their systems are encountering  financial  difficulties  and pose a large unfimded  liability  for future
generations. Existing systems  have not always  protected retirees and will  unlikely  be able to protect those
who grow old in the future.  Furthermore, public pension programs in LAC have neither been very
successful  in achieving  redistributive  objectives  nor in promoting equity. This is not surprising  since pay-
as-you-go defined  benefit plans result  in many  inequities,  and this is especially  true in LAC.
The purpose of this paper is to document  recent pension reforms in Latin America. Chile was the
first country to  initiate reforms in 1981 and major reforms have been undertaken or are underway in
Argentina,  Bolivia, Colombia,  Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Other countries,  including  Brazil, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador,  Honduras, and Paraguay,  are engaged in serious  discussions. This paper highlights
the problems associated  with the public  pension systems,  the characteristics  of the reforms that have been
instituted,  and lessons  learned.
I.  BACKGROUND
Some of the earliest pension plans in the Latin American region were  established under the
auspices  of private organizations  in the beginning  of the 1  800s. Later, a number  of countries  in the region
established public pension programs.  The rationale for government provision of pensions stems from
several assumptions'.  First, low income individuals  and households may not have sufficient earnings
during their lifetime  to save for old age consumption. Other households  may have sufficient  earnings  to
accrue savings, but their preference is to  consume rather than save for  their old  age.  Mandatory
retirement programs that force savings can eliminate  the latter problem, and redistributive  effects of a
public  pension plan can address  the former.
But there are several  important  reasons for reform. Many of the public  pension plans in the region
encountered financial  difficulties  in the 1970s and 1980s, and by the 1990s, their sustainability  was and
remains in jeopardy.  There is a need to address the large, hidden public debt implications  for unfunded
liabilities. Meanwhile, such costly systems are characterized  frequently by low levels of coverage and
public dissatisfaction  is rising  with both the level of pensions  and the quality  of service.
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A. TBE NEED FOR PENSION  REFORM
Three major factors have contributed  to the need for reform: insufficient  contributions,  generous
benefits,  and variable  coverage amnong  workers.
Insufficient  Contributions
The public pension plans are pay-as-you-go systems in  which  current outlays for  present
beneficiaries  are paid for by contributions  from revenues  from earmarked  taxes.  Contributions  have been
insufficient  to meet present obligations to pensioners for a variety of reasons.  Contributions to public
plans generally  emanate from payroll taxes.  In the southern part of the region where life expectancy is
comparable  to that of Europe with very low population  growth rates because of a sharp decline  in fertlity,
payroll taxes can be up to  35 percent of wages or salaiy.  Recent increases in the rates have been
necessitated by the increase in the dependency  ratio which measures  the relationship  between the number
of pensioners to the number of active workers contributing  to the plan.  Higher payroll tax rates have
contributed to payroll tax evasion which tends to increase pressure to raise rates even higher.  In the
northern part of the region where life expectancy  is lower and where pension systems  have had a shorter
history, contributions are generally  5-10 percent of payroll taxes. Moreover, in a number of countries in
the region,  inflation  has eroded the real value of reserves. When reserves have been invested, government
requirements  may stipulate  that they be invested  in public projects that have low rates of return.  This, in
tun,  generates pressure to increase contributions.
Generous Benefits
Public  pension systems  typically  are not progressive  and contribute  to arbitrary income distribution
within  and among generations. Further, they have been characterized  by an increasing  mismatch  between
contributions and benefits.  The statutory benefits provided to  pensioners in LAC are generally more
generous compared to  other countries.  Retirement ages are low and the number of years that  an
individual  must work are shorter than in other countries.  But actual benefits tend to be less than the
projected amount the  systems should be paying.  The real value of pensions has eroded owing to
demographic  trends that put pressure on the average benefit. Moreover, notwithstanding  laws requiring
fill indexation,  in periods of very high inflation  as in Argentina in 1990, the real value of pensions has
eroded quite drastically. These sources of erosion have precluded governments from abiding by the
replacement  principle of the pension plans, namely that a pension is to replace a certain percentage of
working life income.  As downward pressure on average pensions continued, govemrnments  such as
Argentina sought to establish a minimum  threshold to protect pensioners with the smallest pensions.
These adjustments  have resulted in a transition from systems  based on the principle  of replacement  to a
system  that provides a level of benefit  that has gravitated  toward a minimum  benefit.
Variable Coverage
Ideally the entire population should have access  to some old age income, at least at the poverty
level. And all  workers should have a portion of their earnings  replaced  consistent  with their contributions.
But the region's public pension plans cover varymg  percentages of the population. Chile and Argentina
have the largest percentage of the population covered.  Coverage rates in several Central American
countries and Bolivia are less than 20 percent of the formal workforce.  Since the formal workforce in
some countries  is relatively  small,  pension coverage  is even more limited  than appears at first sight.PENSIONREFORMiNLATINAMERiCa  Page  3
While  not every  country  has the same  degree  of problems  with regard  to contributions,  benefits
and coverage,  the preponderance  of these  concerns  suggests  that these  problems  are inherent  in pay-as-
you-go,  defined  benefit  plans.
B.  ESSENTIAL  DATA  FOR  ASSESSING  THE  HEALTH  OF  PENSION  SYSTEMS
In most countries  worldwide,  pension  reform  typically  occurs  in the context  of a fiscal  crisis  or
impending  fiscal  crisis  affecting  the solvency  of the pension  system. This occurs  in part because  of the
political  resistance  to changing  current  pension  systems.  At the same  time,  surpluses  in a largely  unfunded
system  may  not be an indicator  of financial  health. A second  reason  pension  reform  often  comes  too late
is the absence  of good data on the fiscal  implications  of the status quo as well as of policy  options  to
reform the system. This problem  is especially  critical  in developing  countries. Basic and reliable
information  on the number  of contributors  and pensioners  is essential  to forecast  future revenues  and
payouts  but is not always  readily  part of the data  that  is brought  to policy  makers'  attention.  Appropriate
models  are  needed  to estimate  future  fiscal  implications.
Demographic and Economic Data
Detailed demographic  information  is basic and essential. Data on present population, mortality
rates, fertility  rates and immigration  are among  some  of the factors  required  to understand  the size and
pace of the aging population in relation to younger cohorts.  The age structure of the population is
important to understand dependency ratios.  Dependency  ratios are defined as the number of younger
people to support the population of older  persons who are retired.
Labor market conditions  are another factor whose trends are important to guide pension policy.
The number of employed individuals  determines  the portion of the younger population  that is contributing
(in pay-as-you-go systems)  toward retirement  payments  to older individuals. Contractions  in ernployment
will affect contributions. So, too, will the definitions  in the pension plans as to those who are covered.
Military and civil servants are among some groups that may be exempted and have their own pension
plans.  The retirement age affects the length of time that a worker will be making contributions.  This
information helps to  determine the effective contribution  group which is contributing money into the
pension system.
The financial  sustainability  of a pension system depends not only on the number of contributors
and pensioners,  but also econonic trends. Macroeconomic  indicators  such as GDP growth, inflation,  real
interest rates and wage growth all affect the financial status of pension funds.  The distribution  of the
working age population according  to wage rates is important  to capture differentiation  in these variables.
Diagnostic data are needed to assess the causes, timing, and degree of seriousness  of problems
associated with present pension systems.  Some fundamental questions need answers in  order for a
diagnosis of overall health to be made.  For example,  the system's dependency ratio may be too high
because the retirement age is too low.  There may be a significant  amount of evasion  that would reduce
revenue.  The number of groups exempted  from coverage may be too high which would affect equity.
The health of a pension system would be affected  by low rates of return to pension assets compared with
the average cost of capital in financial  markets. The return on workers' investments  in a pay-as-you-go
system as compared to a  fully funded system has a  significant  impact on retirement income.  These
questions help to diagnose  the source of financial  imbalance  which allows for appropriate  remedial action
to be taken.Page 4  PENSIONREFORmINLATINAMERICA
Indicators  of Financial  Health  of Pension  Systems
Several  indicators  can  be constructed  to assess  the fiscal  health  of defined  benefit,  pay as you go
systems. They  help evaluate  the impact  of changes  in singular  or multiple  variables. The indicators  can
also  help  in analyzing  the impact  of trade-offs  among  different  policies  that  are most relevant  to a country
formulating  policy.  A sound actuarial  capacity  is needed to  ensure that projections  are modeled
appropriately  although  this is often lacking. The indicators  that are especially  important  include  the
following:
Pension  Fund  Cash  Balance
The cash  balance  in a pension  find  is one of the most important  determinants  of financial  health.
It indicates  whether  present  and anticipated  revenues  are sufficient  to meet  the pensions  of future  retirees.
It can also provide  the timeframe  when a pension  fund will be flush with funds or depleted. Data
indicating  an imminent  shortfall,  e.g. within  five years,  in the pension  fund can be motivation  for policy
reform.
Contribution  Rate  Needed  for  Positive  Cash  Balance
This  indicator  highlights  the amount  of contributions  needed  to keep  the pension  system  in fiscal
balance  each  year. The contribution  rate helps  to determine  whether  to expect  surpluses  or deficits  in a
given  year. It also can track the impact  of a one-time  increase  in contributions  aimed  at guaranteeing
financial  health
Income  Replacement  Rate
The  replacement  rate is a good indicator  for assessing  the degree  to which  pension  benefits  replace
income earned during  employment.  A pension  plan may be designed  to provide  the equivalent  of a
minimum  wage,  less,  or more. It may  be designed  to replace  a certain  percentage  of earnings  depending
upon  the level  of total earnings.  A pension  system  with  a very  low  replacement  rate  typically  garners  little
political  support.  A pension  plan  with a very  high  replacement  rate offers  an incentive  for less  work and
early  retirement.
Retirement  Age
The retirement  age is an important  factor  affecting  fiscal  health. An early  retirement  age decreases
contributions  and increases  required  payouts. Many  countries  have  a statutory  retirement  age to obtain  a
full  pension  with earlier  retirement  allowed  on a reduced  pension.
Net  Pension  Liabilities
Pension  funds  accumulate  liabilities.  Depending  on expected  contributions,  some  portion  of the
liabilities  may  be unfunded.  These  unfunded  liabilities  are often  expressed  as a percentage  of GDP. High
unfunded  pension  liabilities  are often  an impetus  for reform.
Rate  of Return  on Pension  Funds
This  indicator  highlights  the real  rate of return  on existing  finds that is necessary  to achieve  fiscal
sustainability.  It may  be irrelevant  in countries  that have  lihtle  reserves  available  to generate  any  return.
On the other  hand,  if policy  makers  choose  to recapitalize  the system,  the rate  of return  indicator  would  bePENSiONREFOR&fINLATvNAMERICa  Page 5
the measure to assess the efficacy  of a given  level of recapitalization  and whether alternative  approaches  to
investing  fund balances to generate a higher  rate of return may be a proper and useful course of action.
C.  ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS  IN  PENSION  REFORM
The transition  to a reformed pension system  raises economic  issues  that have significant  impact on
the overall economy. The most crucial  overarching  issue is the sustainability  of a pension program. The
financial  well-being of pension systems depends critically  on the economy.  Contributions  to  a pension
system decline when real wages fall.  Likewise if a  pension program establishes large reserves then
investment  and real wages are likely  to increase.
Paying for Benefits for Present  Retirees
A fundamental economic issue is intergenerational  equity, e.g., which generations will pay the
social security  benefits that accrue as liabilities. In pay-as-you-go pension systems,  workers pay for the
benefits of retirees.  In moving to a fully funded system, funds are still needed to pay the benefits of
present retirees. In pension systems  where there are few reserves,  and when workers begin contributing  to
their own individual  accounts rather than pay into a public  pension fund, the resources will be insufficient
to cover the benefits  of current pensioners  as well as older workers who will soon be retiring. Should the
government borrow to finance the benefit and service  the debt through current workers' contributions,  the
cost of this debt can be paid off by present  workers or future generations, or pensioners  may be asked to
bear a higher tax burden.  The importance  of these intergenerational  issues varies with the demographic
profile  of the country undertaking  pension  reform.
Macroeconomic  Effects of Reform
It is expected that pension  reform  will  bring benefits  to the macroeconomy. If this is to take place,
the supply  of labor and capital  needs to increase. Labor supply  can be increased  by reducing  the perceived
and effective  tax rate on wages. Higher labor earnings  result in more national  income, more savings, and
hence, more capital formation. The intention  is to structure incentives  in pension reform policies  to value
savings and work, whereas the present pay-as-you-go  systems  that impose an effective  tax on wages the
incentives  are tilted towards those who seek to have more limited  employment.
II.  NEW DIRECTIONS  FOR  REFORM
Several countries in the region are seizing  opportunities  to reassess  the performance  of the public
pension systems, learn from experience, and identify the characteristics  of pension systems that are
sustainable. One of the lessons leamed is the need to provide incentives  for the efficient  provision of old
age benefits.  Employee contributions must be  linked to  benefits so contributions are not  seen by
participants  as a tax.  It is possible and appropriate  to redistribute  income to older persons whose lifetime
earnings have  been  too  low,  poverty while simultaneously maintaining equity within and  across
generations. At an aggregate  level, public funding  should not distort labor markets and drive employment
into the informal,  non-taxed sectors. Finally,  public  funding should  not distort capital  markets.
Several principles of reform of pension systems can be articulated. Most broadly, the role of
government  in pension systems  needs to be reassessed  -- which may mean a change  in the role of the state
from the provision of old age security  to regulation  of pension systems. This means  an increase  in the role
of the private sector in the management  of pension funds and in the provision of back-up insurance. More
realistic  contribution  levels  are necessary  for sustainability  which means a shift  from defined  benefit  pay-as-Page 6  PENSiONREFORMINLATINAMERrCA
you-go schemes  to defined  contribution,  fully  funded  initiatives.  Moreover,  conditions  of eligibility  for
benefits  also  need  to be appropriately  calibrated  for sustainability.
Two  main  paths  of reform  of the region's  public  pension  system  are  the subject  of consideration  in
a number  of countries.  The  first  approach  is limited  reform  which  would  make  incremental  changes  in the
present system to  make it more financially  sustainable. Typical  reforms  might include  raising  the
retirement  age, increasing  the required  contributions  from  employers  and  employees,  limiting  benefits,  and
increasing  the rate of return  of existing  investments  to generate  a higher  rate of return  Even  these  more
limited  reforms  may  be controversial  in certain  country  contexts.
While  these  reforms  may  bolster  the fiscal  soundness  of public  pension  systems  in the short and
perhaps  medium-temi,  it is uncertain  that they would be sufficient  to  contribute  to long-term  fiscal
soundness.  The expected  benefits  of more comprehensive  reform  that incorporates  provisions  for an
increased  role for the private  sector  in pension  plans  are  more  structural  in nature. They  include  deepening
and  widening  of capital  markets  and  development  or enhancement  of the  insurance  industry.
The success of  more structural changes in  pension systems,  though, often depends on
complementary  reforns that are likely  to be needed  in systems  whose performance  is essential  for the
pension  reform  to bear  fruit. Capital  market  reforms  are needed  including  those  that strengthen  regulation
as well as those  that open up investment  opportunities  in capital  markets,  e.g. eliminating  requirements
that limit  pension  finds investment  only  in government-related  securities.  Back-up  insurance  purchased
by the government  may  necessitate  reforn of the insurance  industry  that allows  the sales  of new types  of
insurance  products  and  increased  competition  among  providers.
Countries  in the LAC region  that  have  undertaken  reform  have  followed  different  paths  based  on
the economic,  demographic  and  other  circumstances.  The  following  sections  highlight  pension  reforns in
a sample  of LAC  countries  -- Chile,  Peru,  Argentina,  Mexico  and  Brazil.
A.  Chile
Chile was the first country  in the region to radically  reform its pension  system in 1981 by
establishing  a mandated  defined  contribution  system  with  private  management  of contributions.  Instead  of
paying  a social  security  tax to the state,  employees  contribute  10 percent  of their  taxable  earnings  to their
own  individual  account  along  with a commission  for private  administration  of the account. Participation
was required for new entrants into the labor force and kept optional  for workers who had been
contributing  to the public  system. Workers  had an incentive  to participate  in the new system  since  their
take home pay increased. The payroll  tax was eliminated  and employers  were required  to turn their
contributions  into salary increases.  The employee's  contribution  was less than the total combined
employer/employee  contributions  under  the prior  system2.
Chile's  system is based on individual  capitalization.  Individual  workers' savings  are directly
correlated  with the amount  of the pension  they  ultimately  receive. It is based  also on administration  of
pension  funds  by private  institutions  referred  to as Pension  Fund  Administrators  (AFP). Employees  can
choose  from  among  16  different  private  pension  fund  administration  companies  (AFP)  to have  the savings
invested  in stocks and bonds.  The pensions  are portable  since  the individual  account  is tied to the
individual  and  not to an employer.  The AFPs'  only  purpose  is to collect  employee  contributions,  invest  the
funds  and administer  benefits. They  engage  in no other  business  so as to avoid  conflict  of interest. The
AFPs are required  to meet a minimum  actual  yield  on a monthly  basis  and are required  to make  up the
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difference  with their own resources if they do not.  This minimum  is based on the average yield of all
AFPs. If an AFP fails to meet the minimum  yield requirement  in a given year the government is required
to make up the difference  for the individual  and the AFP will  be dissolved.
The government  provides a safety  net. All individuals  who meet basic requirements  are entitled  to
a minimun pension notwithstanding  the balances in their individual  account that might otherwise have
precluded them from receiving  the guaranteed minimum. Second, should an individual  become disabled
and therefore unable to make contributions,  the Government  would provide  additional  contributions. If an
AFP is bankrupt, the government guarantees  life annuities  up to 100 percent of the minimum  pension and
75 percent of any amount above  it up to a monthly  maximum.
Lessons Learned
Chile took the first step to  establish a direct link between contribution  rates and benefits and
thereby to link  the savings  effort and with the reward during retirement. Contributions  are not a tax but a
mandatory form of savings. So far, the number of people receiving  pensions through the system has been
quite modest -- 225,000 -- because of the short life  of the new system. Since the inception  of the system,
pension funds have experienced  an annual  average growth rate of 39 percent, now representing  almost 40
percent of GDP. This figure  is expected  to increase  to 60 percent of GDP in 2004.
The replacement  value of the private pension fund can be quite significant. It is estimated that
employees  who contribute 10 percent of their salary  for 40 years and earn  4-6 percent per year will earn a
monthly  pension equivalent  to 50-75 percent of their pre-retirement  gross income. Coverage in Chile  has
increased  to 5.5 million  in 1996.
Although there has been a growth in the number of workers registered  with an AFP, this does not
mean that workers are active  contributors. In fact, the number of active contributors  has declined  from 73
percent of eligible  workers in 1982 to 54 percent in 19963.  Several factors account for the decline.
Unemployment  and economic hardship preclude some individuals  from contributing.  Some employers
have postponed the transfer of funds  to the AFPs and have used them for their own cash flow.
A deeper, more structural problem, however, may account for the decline  in contributors.  The
government guarantees a minimum  pension equivalent  to 75 percent of the minimum  wage or 25 percent
of the worker's annual salary  for the ten years prior to retirement, whichever  is greater.  This provision
may encourage some workers to contribute  only for the minimum  time period required -- 20 years -- to be
eligible  for the minimum  guarantees.  Some estimates suggest that 50 percent of all future pensioners in
Chile could qualify  for the minimum  guaranteed  pension when they retire, which would pose a significant
fiscal  burden. This moral hazard problem  is one that countries contemplating  reform will  need to address.
The cost of the commissions  paid by employees  to the AFPs is another significant  structural factor
that may be impeding contributions. In Chile, the commission  costs were about 5 percent of salary in
1982 but have increased  to more than 8 percent of salary  in 1984. The commissions  are used to defray
what some critics have viewed as excessive  sales and marketing  costs in the AFP industry. The result has
been that the bulk of the retums on the contnbutions went towards commissions. More recently, the
commissions  have declined  to about 3 percent of salary  but they are still relatively  high.  A major reason
for the high commissions  is the high transactions costs that are borne by AFPs owing to the high rate of
switching  among AFPs by workers, which the system  allows creating  negative  incentives. This experience
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in Chile  highlights  the point that in funded schemes  -- just as in unfunded schemes  -- contributions  must be
perceived  as resulting  in commensurate  benefits  plus interest  rates.
There are lessons to be learned from Chile about the impact of reform on efficiency  and equity 5.
Chile  is the only country  in LAC which has had pension  reform in place long enough to analyze  its impact.
Chile's financial  system has become more liquid  with the influx  of pension funds invested in a diversified
portfolio. Early econometric  analysis  suggests  that pension reform has led to financial  deepening  that has
increased total factor productivity  by one percent per year, equivalent  to about half of the increase in total
factor productivity in the country.  This result provides a basis for anticipated efficiency gains from
pension reform in Chile  and other countries  that pursue effective  reform.
There has yet to be a quantitative  analysis  conducted of the equity  implications  of pension reform.
It appears that upon observation,  equity  was enhanced  in Chile  with the minimum  pension guarantee to
workers who meet the eligibility  criteria. The guaranteed minimum  is financed out of general revenue
which is a more broad-based  and progressive  tax and therefore more equitable.
New equity issues arise, though, under pension reform. If high and low wage workers are in the
same annuity  pool, low wage workers end up paying  more than their expected  benefits  while higher wage
workers end up paying  less than their anticipated  benefits. Another inequity  arises as low income workers
are hurt more than high income  workers by flat fee payments  required  for pension fund management.
B.  Peru
Peru has two publicly sponsored  pension systems,  Sistema Nacional de Pensiones (SNP) and the
CUdula  Viva System (CV).  The SNP was created in 1973 as a PAYG defined benefit system through
consolidation  of separate retirement programs. The SNP covered only 50 percent of the labor force and
in 1990 only 50 percent of its affiliates  made contributions.
The CV system started as the civil service  pension system in the 19th century and was slated in
1974 to be phased out. Yet events changed  and the system  grew as additional  groups of public  employees
were covered under the system. The CV system  is costly  owing to generous benefits  and low contribution
rates.  Female (male) workers can receive benefits after 12 (15) years of service. The replacement  rate
varies between 50 percent if the worker has 15 years service and 100 percent when the worker has 30
years of service.
In 1992 private pension funds were authorized (AFP) as an alternative to the SNP.  The new
system, Sistema Privado de Pensiones (SPP) allowed workers to have individual  retirement accounts in
AFPs. This new program allowed  workers who opened  individual  retirement accounts in AFPs to receive
partial credit for previous contributions  to the SNP with a bond (Bono de Reconocimiento -BR).  The
new law, though, did not close off entry into SNP and did not allow public employees  to transfer to the
new system. The reforms also permitted different  contribution  rates and different  retirement ages for the
SNP and the SPP. More recent reforms in July 1995  eliminated  these differences  which led to an increase
in transfers from the SNP to the SPP, and through increases  in the retirement age, led to reductions in
contingent  pension obligations  of the SNP.
In July 1996, public employees  were given  the right and incentives  to transfer  from the CV to the
SPP. Also, the National Pension Office  was given  the authority  to audit claims  for CV benefits to ensure
4 See Munoz,  1997.
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their legitimacy. A pension trust fund was established,  the  Fondo Consolidado  de Reservas Previsionales,
to back pension obligations. A ceiling for CV pensions was put in place, and pension adjustments of
employees of formerly owned state enterprises are subject to the same limits as SNP pensions.  These
changes  helped to reduce the fiscal  impact of future CV liabilities.
As of September 1996, an estimated 1.4 million  Peruvian  workers were affiliated  with the fully
funded system, and the PAYG system covered approximately 980,000 active and  320,000 retired
employees 6. The defined benefit program for civil servants covered 250,000 active and 50,000 retired
employees. The deficit  for the SNP was an estimated  US$207 million  in 1997 and is expected to rise in
the next decade because of an anticipate  decline  in contributions. Meanwhile,  the treasury spends  US$400
million annually  in CV pensions which does not include costs paid by state-owned enterprises or local
governments. In sum, the country's public  pension systems  -- SNP and CV -- are actuarially  bankrupt.
Present obligations  exceed the Government's ability  to pay, and these obligations  will grow exponentially
in the next 20 years.
The private pension funds (AFPs) have an estimated  US$1 billion  in funds. Each AFP manages a
single  portfolio and each affiliate  can have only one account. Each AFP is required to have returns within
a range of 50-150 percent of the average returns of other AFPs. The rate of return on the funds has been
hampered by regulations that limit the diversity  of allowable  investment  options.  AFPs have therefore
been investing in Central Bank paper, as well as a narrow range of bonds, certificates  of deposit, and
stocks.  The real returns realized by the affiliates  have been significantly  negative over this period.
Another hindrance  to more robust growth is the commission  for account management  which is a high two
percent of salary. In November 1996, Peru instituted changes  to discourage  the high commissions  and to
increase competition among AFPs to  invest among a wider range of portfolio options.  Especially
important is the incentive to  move away from investment in short term obligations toward long term
financing  which can bolster the economy.
Continued progress in Peru  depends on  continuing reform of the regulatory framework for
pension funds and a reduction of the fiscal  impact of outstanding  obligations  from ongoing public pension
programs. To this end, also in November 1996 the eligibility  criteria  to apply for a BR have been eased.
Now, all new applicants  that have made contributions  to the SNP in the last 10 years prior to December
1996 will be eligible  for a BR.  The intent is to create an incentive especially  for younger workers to
transfer  from the SNP to the new regime.
C.  Argentina
Argentina's pension systems had their inception  in the early 1900s. A variety of pension funds
existed  for different  groups of workers. Each had independent  rules and benefits. Most of the early  funds
were designed as fully funded systems; a few had pay-as-you-go schemes. But the early pension funds
were  subject to  a  number of  deficiencies.  Generous benefits outpaced the  actuarial value of the
contributions. The impact of demographic  trends began to be felt, and coupled  with sufficient  long term
planning,  contributed  to a growing crisis as financial  instability  began  to emerge. The ratio of those age 65
and older to the working age population  was 6 per  100 in 1950; in 1990, the figure was 15 per 100; in
2050, it could reach up to  29 per  100.  By  1993, the national pension system was characterized by
pervasive evasion, low retirement age, and lax rules for eligibility  because of disability. Evasion was
estimated  to be as high as 46 percent of eligible  workers. The deficit  ranged from I percent to 1.5 percent
of GDP which was partly a function of high pensions and replacement  rates, along with indexation of
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pensions.  The Argentine authorities were compelled to  change the benefit formula which resulted in
reduced pensions. The negative  response to this change  propelled  radical  reform.
In June 1994, Argentina  began a transition to a new pension system with two compulsory  pillars
that combined elements of a pay as you go  system and a  fully funded system.  The first pillar or
component is administered  by the state and provides a basic universal  pension to all workers who have
made contribution  for at least 30 years.  The amount of the pension is about 30 percent of the average
covered wage.  The second component of the new pension structure is a funded component with defined
contributions  with individual  accounts managed by selected  management  companies  (Administradoras  de
Fondos de JubiIaciones  y  Pensiones  - AFJPs).  It also includes a state-run defined benefit plan that is
unfunded and  available to  those that choose to  stay with that  plan.  The reforms left open some
weaknesses such as the retention of wage indexation of pensions under the old system which was
subsequently  corrected in March 1995  when wage indexation  of pension was eliminated  with a cap placed
on high pensions.  Remaining  weaknesses include high rates of evasion and the unfunded nature of the
second component.
All wage earners  with the exception  of the military,  police, and provincial  workers are required to
participate  in the new system, although they have a choice as to whether to join the state-rn  or publicly
managed second pillar or the new pension structure  with regard to the first pillar which is entirely  public,
workers may be eligible  for a basic  universal  pension (PBU) which is equal to 27.5 percent of the average
covered wage after a minimum  of 30 years of employment. This public pillar is financed by a 16 percent
contribution  assessed on employers  and from earmarked  taxes from general  revenues.
The second pillar has funded and unfunded components. The funded component is managed by
AFJPs.  Their sole purpose is to administer  pension funds and benefits.  They cannot engage in other
business. To become an AFJP, an entity must have a:  minimum  of US$3 million  in capital and possess
managerial  and technical competence. Presently,  six of the AFJPs manage about 70 percent of affiliates
and funds.  The unfunded component is a defined benefit scheme operated by the state that offers 0.85
percent of the average salary  of the last 10 years of employment  for every  year of service. It operates on a
PAYG basis financed by  an  11 percent contribution rate assessed on employees.  This component
represents  a weakness  in the pension reform  design as it is unfunded.
The new pension system has had only a few years of operation.  So far, there is no clear link
between the size of AFJPs and their profitablity and operating efficiency. Some AFJPs are sustaining
significant  operating losses while others have exceeded  the break-even point. The private component has
attracted 67 percent of all workers who participate  in the new integrated system. In the first two years of
operation, AFJPs, mobilized  4.62 billion pesos, a portion of which was used for operating costs.  Total
funds mobilized  by the pension funds including  investment  income earned amounted to 3.84 billion  pesos
in June 1996, equivalent  to 14 percent of GDP.
Evasion remains high in the new system 7. Only 59 percent of contributors  were making payments
in 1996,  resulting in a monthly  deficit  of US$450 million. Annual outlays  in 1996  totaled US$15.3 billion.
Overpayments  due to errors and fraud are estimated  at US$300 million  -US$1 billion.
Notwithstanding  the problems,  many  younger workers have  joined and are contributing  to a large
and fast growing pool of long-term financial  resources. In June 1996, assets totaled 3.8 billion  pesos, or
1.4% of GDP and 6.2 billion pesos or 2.2 percent of GDP by March 1997.  The AFJPs have earned
substantial  rates of investment  return but have encountered  high start-up and marketing costs.  Although
there have been high investment  returns, individual  affiliates  have so far had negative real returms  because
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of the high commissions. As assets accumulate and operating costs moderate, net returns will likely
increase.
Size of Funds
Level  Level  Change
bn pesos  % GDP  % GDP
December 1994  0.52  0.18
March 1995  0.95  0.35  0.17
June 1995  1.36  0.47  0.12
September 1995  1.89  0.70  0.23
December 1995  2.50  0.91  0.21
March  1996  3.22  1.22  0.31
June 1996  3.84  1.40  0.18
September 1996  4.49  1.63  0.23
December 1996  5.33  1.91  0.28
March  1997  6.24  2.20  0.29
Source:  Dinniri  Vittas,  "The  Argentine  Pension  Reform  and its Relevance
for Eastern  Europe"  pp. 22
The Argentine system shares similarities  as well as differences  with the Chilean  system. Argentina
has less extensive  pension privatization  and the new system  provides a basic pension  to most workers who
have the opportunity  to remain  with the unfunded public  pillar. The costs of the pension system are higher
in Argentina  because of the higher level of pensions  and a greater degree of redistribution. Both countries
systems  are characterized  by a gap between  the number  of affiliates  and active contributors.
D.  Mexico
Since 1944, Mexico has had a social security system for formal private sector workers and the
self-employed. It consisted not only of retirement benefits  but also retiree health benefits  and disability.
Approximately  80 percent of the formal  labor force is covered. Contributions  are 8.5 percent of wages.
Other pension  plans cover public sector workers and the military. Self-employed  agricultural  workers and
up to  10 million  underemployed  and unemployed  workers are not covered by the system.  The present
system guarantees a minimum  pension equal  to the minimum  wage. At least 10 years of contributions  are
necessary  for eligibility  for the minimum  pension.
Reform of Mexico's  social security  system  was undertaken because of the financial  fragility  of the
system.  Increased life expectancy and lower population growth have led to  a  rapid aging of  the
population -- notwithstanding a large share of young people in the population.  These demographic
pressures compounded the more immediate severe financial disequilibrium.  At  inception, pension
surpluses  were designed  to finance the structural requirements  of the social security system and to fund
health and maternity insurance. In fact, pension reserves did not accumulate  until 1960, 16 years after the
system  was established. Meanwhile,  benefits  outpaced contributions. Benefits  were originally  designed  to
cover only the retired worker and not dependents. Moreover, before 1989 minimum  pensions increased
from 35 percent of the minimum  wage to 100 percent in 1995. The latter steps was taken owing to the
sharp decline  in the real value of pensions. In 1989 pensions  were indexed to the minimum  wage.  The
financial  status of the social security  system in 1996 suggested the need for either a three-fold increase in
contributions  or an increase in government contributions  totaling 1 percent of GDP in the year 2000 and
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1992 Pension Reform
In 1992, Mexico established  the Retirement Savings System (SAR) as a mandatory filly funded
savings scheme which was based on Individual  Retirement Accounts with an employer contribution on
behalf of private and public sector employees. Employee  contributions  were voluntary, but these did not
occur.  Contributions were deposited in individual  accounts and managed by commercial  banks.  They
held the individual account funds for up to  four days before sending them to the central bank.  The
contributions earned a government guaranteed  interest rate of at least 2 percent a year over the inflation
adjusted  balance  using the inflation  rate of the previous  month.
This  attempt at  reform proved to  be  unsuccessful because of  institutional and  conceptual
problems. As a result, beginning  in July 1997 no firther contributions  were to be made into the old SAR
accounts.  Under the reformed system employees can collect the balances in their individual  retirement
accounts upon retirement. The reasons for the failure of this attempt at pension reform are numerous.
There was an overall lack of consistent  supervision  of accounts by commercial  banks and the absence of
an  adequate regulatory framework for investment managers.  Banks received low commissions for
account administration,  and the relatively  small amounts in the SAR accounts also generated a lack of
interest by the banks.  There was little incentive  for banks to participate  in the system in the first place.
Political  pressure appears  to have been the primary  motivating  factor.
The lessons  learned from the 1992 pension reform are clear cut.  A regulatory capacity  needed to
be operational at the outset.  Participants -- individuals  and banks -- require an incentive rather than
coercion --- to participate. Contributors  need to have options to select from but in the original reform,
contributors  were not allowed  to choose the managers  of their accounts. Finally,  the savings  were used to
finance public expenditure rather than to  establish an investment regime that would deepen financial
markets.  Moreover, contributions to  the individual accounts were perceived as a tax rather than a
contribution  to retirement savings.
The failure of the 1992 reforrn demonstrated  the complexity  of partial  reform of pension systems
which by necessity have many dimensions. Difficult  political economy issues cannot be ignored.  The
reform had not only to be redesigned  within the framework  of a weakened financial  system following  the
1994 peso crisis but to be done in the context of constitutionally  protected benefits  to pensioners.
1995 Pension  Reform
The Mexican Congress enacted the new social security law in December 1995.  A  second
legislative  package enacted in April 1996 spelled out the implementation  of reforms.  The new system
eliminates  the old pay-as-you-go system.  It provides current participants with a choice at retirement
between the benefits under the old system or their balances under the new system.  It  guarantees a
minimum  level of benefits for low income participants. Finally,  it eliminates  cross subsidization  among
retirement,  health and other insurance  branches. The reform of Mexico's  system started on July 1, 1997
while private management  of the pension  funds  began at the end of September 1997.
The design of this new pension reform is based on a  three dimensional strategy.  The first
dimension  is a minimum  guaranteed pension equivalent  to the indexed minimum  wage for low-income
workers. This component has a redistributive  element to address equity  issues. A second component is a
fiflly-funded  mandatory individual  savings account regime with competitive  mutual fund management.
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The Mexican  Social  Security  Institute,  IMSS,  will  continue  to have  a role as the legal  enforcer  of
all contribution  collections  and  will  continue  to provide  benefits  to existing  pensioners.  It will continue  to
provide  benefits  to transition  workers  choosing  the old  PAYG  system  at retirement,  and  be the provider  of
the minimum  pension  guarantee  to all  private  sector  workers.
The reform  of Mexico's  pension  system  came  at a time when  its membership  consisted  of a very
young  age structure,  making  reform  easier. It also  follows  a period  of high  inflation  in the 1980s  and  the
peso crisis  which  eroded  the real value  of pensions  and  the guaranteed  minimum  pension. Furthermore,
the minimum  wage  was at a very low  level  in real  terms. The new system  limits  the government's  fiscal
responsibilities  only  to minimum  pension  guarantees  rather than  the fiscal  soundness  of the system  as a
whole.  But it enhances  the government's  responsibility  to establish  a regulatory  framework  for the private
sector  management  of invested  funds. The credibility  of the reform  hinges  on this necessary  element  of
reform.
The basic design  creates  the potential  for more effective  provisions  for income  security  during
retirement  years provided  the contributions  of employers  (5.5%) into a housing savings  account  for
workers  earns  positive  real  returns. In the  past this  fund,  INFONAVIT,  has not done so,  thus  presenting  a
major  challenge.  Nonetheless,  this  reform  represents  a step  to shift  to from a defined  benefit  and pay as
you go system  to a defined  contribution  model  that has the potential  to enhance  the domestic  capital
market  with  the creation  of a new  group of  institutional  investors.
IUnder  the new rules, AFORES  have been established  which are specialized  administrators  of
retirement  funds  and  manage  individual  retirement  finds (SIEFORES).  The  AFORES  are single  purpose
business  corporations  established  by the private  sector  and  trade  unions. The IMSS  can establish  a single
AFORE. Workers  are required  to contribute  6.5 percent  of earnings  to AFORES. The operation  of the
AFORES  is to be financed  through  commissions.  Each  needs  to maintain  a minimum  paid-in  capital  of
N$25  million  and a special  reserve  fund. The capital  of the pension  fund  administrators  cannot  be used  to
meet the obligations  of subsidiaries  of the group.  AFORES  are to be owned  by Mexicans  but non-
Mexican  financial  institutions  may  operate  AFORES  under  NAFTA. No individual  or corporation  can
control  more than 10 percent  of AFORE  stock. As of September  1997,  the majority  of AFORES  have
foreign  partners. Furthermore,  some 90 percent of private sector  workers have enrolled  in the new
system.
The first  priority  in Mexico's  pension  reform  was to establish  a regulatory  framework  to ensure
the security  of pension  fund investments. The April 1996 legislation  established  the structure  and
delineated  the powers  of CONSAR  and provided  guiding  principles  for the establishment,  operation  and
supervision  of the AFORES  and  the SIEFOREs  . It also  established  rules  governing  conflicts  of interest,
market  share  limits,  and  investor  protection.  In September  1996  CONSAR  had finalized  draft  regulations
and stipulated  the authorization  and capitalization  of AMOREs  and SIEFOREs,  commissions  and fees
charged  by AFOREs,  and rules for the promotion  and marketing  of AFOREs  and SIEFOREs  to the
public.
CONSAR  has  been  given  broad  powers  to set  and  enforce  rules. It has supervisory  authority  over
AFOREs  and supervisory  authority  over other participants  in the pension  system  such as banks and
insurance  companies.  CONSAR  also  has  the authority  to review  the moral  integrity  and  technical  capacity
of the board  of directors  of each  AFORE. A system  of arbitration  and conciliation  that mediates  claims  of
workers  is overseen  by CONSAR.Page 14  PENSIONREFoRM  INLATINAMERICA
Rules governing the establishment  of AFOREs controlled by foreign financial institutions have
been finalized  by the Ministry  of Finance and Public Credit. These rules permit a class of AFOREs with
majority  control by foreign financial  institutions  from NAFTA member countries. Up to 49 percent of the
shares of such foreign-owned  AFORES can be held by other foreign or Mexican  shareholders.
CONSAR's regulations on fees and commissions  allow each AFORE to freely set management
fees based on a percentage of contributions  (a front end fee), and percentage of assets under management,
or  some combination of these two factors.  In addition, CONSAR will issue regulations requiring
disclosure  of the net rate of returm.
The regulatory  framework sets limits on market share. Any single  AFORE can manage no more
than 20 percent of the system's assets.  The purpose of this provision is to  encourage competition in
pension fumd  management. To enable this, CONSAR  was to hold off authorizing  any AFORE to conduct
business until there  is  a  significant number of  competitors willing to  provide AFORE  services.
Regulations also lay out rules for advertising and marketing.  All prospectuses must be reviewed and
approved by CONSAR to ensure fair and clear descriptions  of portfolio and investment  policies.
The reform demonstrates an important  shift to private intermediation  of retirement funds.  These
funds can become the largest financial  industry in the country within a relatively short time period. The
effectiveness  of the investment  and the return on investments  will affect retirees'  welfare,  the savings  rate,
capital market development  and the overall soundness and practicality  of continued reform.  Hence, the
groundwork for very significant  reform has been laid. But substantial  follow-up is needed to ensure the
sustainability  and political  support for such reforms.
Final regulations on the management  of investments  are forthcoming  and will address the need for
SIEFOREs to maintain  judicious balance  between investment  vehicles,  namely  government bonds, private
equity and debt instruments  as well as the valuation  of portfolio securities. An important consideration  for
CONSAR is how to regulate portfolio composition given  limitations  in the Mexican securities  markets.
These limitations  include  the fairly small  number  of private issuers in the market and the potential negative
effects of concentration of investment  in related companies. Another issue is the appropriateness  of too
high investment  in the banking system, especially  when those institutions  may be unable to meet capital
adequacy standards. CONSAR also will consider  the suitability  of certain  poorly-rated debt instruments
for mandatory pension funds, as well as the amount of liquidity  in many  listed equity securities.
CONSAR's  consideration  of these issues highlights  the need for complementary  securities  markets
reforms. Indeed, the success of Mexico's  privately-managed  mandatory pension system depends crucially
on improvements  in the regulation  and supervision  of Mexico's securities  markets. CONSAR  rand CNBV
are working to improve the standards for rating securities and enhancing  the disclosure of information
consistent  with international  standards.
The macroeconomic effects of the reformed Mexican system are promising.  They offer the
opportunity for increased  financial  savings  and direct investment. Higher levels of capital can be expected
to be injected  into the economy. In the short-term,  though, there is likely  to be an increase in government
liabilities  owing to the cost of transition.  In 1997, fiscal  costs of the transition  were estimated at around 1
to 1.5  percent of GDP.
Besides the need to definitively  take measures  to ensure that housing savings with INFONAVIT
earn a real positive return other challenges for the new system are limited coverage, administrative
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public confidence  in the new system from the outset to ensure maximum  affiliation  of eligible  workers.
Finally,  continued restructuring  of IMSS will be essential. On the regulatory front, the range of available
pension and insurance products is restricted. The limits  imposed on entry of other potential providers of
pension services limits the scope of competition and the long-term efficiency  and effectiveness  of the
system.
E.  Brazil
Brazil has had a tradition of social insurance  provision which originated  in the early 1920s. The
pension system has two components. The first is a mandatory  defined  benefit program.  Pnivate  sector and
state-owned enterprises  are covered by the Insfituto Nacional De Seguridad Social (INS  S).  A separate
program for civil servants exists and provides more generous benefits.  Civil servants at the state level
have a separate pension scheme  whereby  retirement benefits  are, for the most part, treated like wages and
paid directly by the Treasury.  Other pension plans exist which are voluntary.  Under the old-age
retirement scheme,  urban workers are eligible  to retire at age 65 for men and 60 for women.  Until 1992,
participation  in the system was required for at least five years.  The years of participation  is being raised
gradually -- by six months every year -- and will have increased from 6 years in 1994 to  15 by the year
2012.  The replacement  rate ranges between 75 and 100 percent. The minimum  benefit is the equivalent
of the minimum  wage and the maximum  benefit  is the equivalent  of 10 times the minimum  wage.  In 1986
Brazil's social security  system accounted  for 42 percent of social expenditures. Only one half of Brazilian
workers were covered. At that time, estimates  indicated that 41 percent of the population in the lowest
two income groups received  about 8 percent of all social security  benefits.
As with many of the pay as you go pension systems,  Brazil's  pension program has significant  fiscal
imbalances.  In  1988, an  estimated 54 percent of contributions to  the social security scheme were
necessary  to finance  pensions. But by the end of 1995, pension  expenditures  had grown to 115 percent of
contributions  resulting  in a monthly cash flow deficit  of US$431 million. The cash imbalances  were partly
a function of a change in policy in 1988 which doubled  the minimum  pension from 50 to  100 percent of
the minimum  wage.  The retirement age of rural workers was reduced by five years.  As a result, the
number of new retirees increased  by 34 percent in 1992.
F.  Comparing  Pension  Reforms  in LAC
Mexico's pension reforms differ from those in Chile and Argentina in several important ways.
Eligibility  for Mexico's new pension system requires  25 years of work, with a week defined as equivalent
to seven working days. This high standard for eligibility  reduces use of the minimum  pension guarantee
paid for by the Government. A second major difference  is that Mexico completely eliminated  its PAYG
system  whereas Chile and Argentina  retained  the option to contribute  to the PAYG plan. New workers in
Mexico, as in Chile, are fully integrated into the new system.  The Mexico system also precludes new
entrants into the system from switching  between the old and new system which increases administrative
costs and promotes volatility  in the volume  of private sector  funds that are managed.
A third major difference  is the terms and conditions  of the minimum  pension guarantee. It is now
lower in Mexico than in other countries. Presently,  it is about 40 percent of the average wage and the
figure likely will decline to about 25 percent of the average wage when the first cohort of new workers
retires.  This low minimum  pension guarantee gives workers an incentive  to save and reduces the moral
hazard that accompanies  high minimum  guarantees. Another difference  is that in Mexico, each worker
can invest in multiple  funds offered by the same administrator  whereas in Chile, Argentina  and Peru, each
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Not all countries  have followed  the altogether  fully funded, defined contribution  approach. Chile,
Mexico, Bolivia and Peru have this approach as their primary system.  Colombia,  though, has made the
PAYG system the primary system  if indviduals prefer, but they can also choose the fully  funded defined
contribution  option as their first choice. In companng Chile and Argentina the latter has higher levels of
targeted pensions and targeted redistribution.
III.  ISSUES  IN  PENSION  REFORM
A limited  approach to reform and a more comprehensive  reform entail significant  transitions that
may carry political as well as fiscal costs. Any reduction in social security  benefits  is politically  difficult  to
introduce.  It usually necessitates legislative  action.  Such changes might be more palatable if they are
linked to an increase in other benefits  which would make a pension system more equitable. Changes can
be introduced incrementally,  e.g., gradually  increasing  the retirement age or postponing the year in which
the retirement age begins to increase.  Governments  can play an important role by periodically  assessing
and publishing  annually  the actuarial balance of the system,  under the assumption  of current benefits. In
the long-term, better public understanding of the issues involved can be helpful towards ensuring an
equitable  pension system  that is fiscally  sustainable.
There are some essential ingredients for successful pension reform.  Macroeconomic stability  is
central for confidence in a reformed system.  Financial  markets need to be functioning well and real
interest rates need to  be  positive.  The insurance industry needs to  be  relatively well developed,
competitive,  and efficient. Finally, the capacity for regulation and supervision  must be adequate to the
task at hand.  These more technical conditions  for pension reform must complement  a political climate  in
which the  reform of politically sensitive pension systems which often involves tightening eligibility,
increasing equity and redressing abuse, is possible.  The public's appreciation  of the fragility of present
publicly  provided  pension systems  may serve as an impetus  to such reform.
A. Objectives of Reform
Pension reform should aim to achieve  multiple  objectives. A government's  strategy should  aim to:
*  increase the equity and efficiency  of the social security system for retirees to  allow for
universal coverage  that assists  the rich and poor alike;
*  ensure a financially  viable system  not only  in the short term, but also in the long term; .
*  minimize  the fiscal  impact of making  the transition  to a new system;
- *  encourage the transparency of the new system with regard to the way it is to function as
well as the financial implications  of the new system for the government as well as the
affiliates;
*  promote greater private sector financial  intermediation  and thereby enhance the array and
soundness of financial  instruments;  and
*  enhance the allocative efficiency  of domestic savings and increase the aggregate level of
savings.
B.  Principles of Reform
Sound pension reform depends upon the adoption of several key principles.  In addition to
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*  a sound regulatory  and supervisory  framework  to  ensure  the integrity  of the system
bolstered  by effective  enforcement;
*  the establishment  of a parallel  voluntary  system  to encourage  savings  and occupational
pension  plans -- with  the relevant  regulatory structures;
*  complementary  reforms  in the banking  system  and securities  markets  to ensure  a well-
functioning  market  that  can  generate  a reasonable  rate  of return  on investment  in a manner
that  inspires  confidence  among  investors;
*  recognition  and  financing  of the fiscal  costs  of transition  and  identifying  sources  to finance
any  implicit  social  security  debt  into explicit  debt;  and
*  ensuring  that the public  is fully  informed  about the new pension  system  so as to build
public  support  and  encourage  full  participation.
C.  Issues  for  Reform
Voluntary  or Mandatory
A key decision  that needs  to be made in the reform  of pensions  programs  is the nature  of the
mandate,  if any,  that  will  be imposed.  A voluntary  system  may  be deemed  appropriate  in the absence  of a
social  consensus  on mandatory  savings.  If a mandatory  approach  is considered,  the mandates  could  be on
employers,  employees,  or both.  A mandatory  system  is based on several  premises. First, mandatory
schemes  might be imposed  to avoid instances  of moral hazard  whereby  individuals  may  presume  that
society  will  take care  of them  irrespective  of whether  they  save. Second,  mandatory  participation  may  be
imposed  to protect  those  whose  preference  would  otherwise  be to consume  rather  than save  during  their
working  years.
Whether  employers,  employees,  or both should  be subject  to a mandate  also  needs  consideration.
A mandate  on employees  only  may  emerge  in country  contexts  where  company-based  pension  programs
are non-existent  or poorly  developed.  Philosophical  principles  may  affect  such a choice. The notion of
personal  responsibility  may be attractive  to those who believe  that more efficient  and effective  future
savings  may  result  when  individual  responsibility  provides  a potentially  powerful  incentive.  An employer
mandate  might  be appropriate  in countries  where employer-based  pensions  already  exist  on a voluntary
basis. With an employer  mandated  system,  large  firms  establish  and administer  their own pension  plans
while  small  firms  rely  on outside  contractors  to administer  their  pension  programs.  Another  variant  might
be to impose  an employer  mandate  but offering  individual  employees  the option  to choose  an alternative
independent  fund operated  by a financial  institution  or other  group. Another  variation  would  address  the
high  administrative  costs of the Chilean  system  attributed,  in part,  to individual  contracting  with funds.
Under  this approach  employees  could  be mandated  to participate  but  group  contracts  can  be negotiated  by
employers  in return  for group discounts.  Lower  costs  associated  with group  contracts  can  be passed  onto
employees.
The encouragement  of voluntary  pension  plans  simultaneously  with a reformed  mandated  system
can  be a positive  step  as part of overall  pension  reform.  Voluntary  plans,  such  as those  offered  by private
companies,  may permit  workers to receive  a pension  at an earlier  age than under a country's social
security  law. In the case  of Mexico,  the new Social  Security  Law and  Pension  Systems  Law introduced
for the first  time a regulatory  and supervisory  framework  for Mexico's  private  voluntary  pension  plans.
Such regulations  should  require  voluntary  plans  to be actuarially  sound  and be subject  to full  regulation
and supervision.  This  approach  can  help  bolster  public  confidence  in  voluntary  plans.Page 18  PENSiONREFORMINLATINAMERICA
Employee  Choice
The strngency  of regulations  that need to be developed  will depend  on the extent  to which a
pension  system  is voluntary  or mandatory.  Under  mandatory  programs  there is a higher  threshold  that
govemments  need to meet in their regulatory  apparatus  as compared  to voluntary  programs,  in part
because  there  is more  at stake. Decisions  about  how  much  choice  to allow  workers  depends  on the intent
of the pension  system. if the system  has redistributive  goals,  it would  have limited  success  if employees
could  opt out. In other systems  that  have  more  of an individual  savings  and  capitalization  approach,  self-
employed  workers  are sometimes  exempted  from  mandatory  participation.  Tax incentives  might  be used
as an alternative  to encourage  participation.  Some  pension  systems  may  make  participation  voluntary  for
older  workers  beyond  the retirement  age  who  remain  employed.
There is another  level of employee  choice  that can be incorporated  within a reformed  pension
system.  In Chile  and most other  countries  in the region  employees  are allowed  to have only  one account
per worker. The  intent  is to promote  simplicity  in the system.  But this rule  requires  workers  to place  of
their  retirement  savings  with one  pension  fund  manager.  Allowing  open-ended  diversification  would  make
determinations  of compliance  in mandated  programs  more  difficult.  But it also  precludes  young  and old
workers,  for example,  from pursuing  different  investment  strategies  that may  be more  suited  to their  risk
tolerance  and  financial  needs.
Establishing  a Sound Regulatory  Framework
The  growth  in private  pension  fimds  in industrial  countries  and more  recently  in countries  in LAC
that  are reforming  their  pension  programs  has generated  a substantial  interest  in the regulatory  framework
that should  be established  to govern  their operations 8. Generally,  there is variability  in the degree of
stringency  in the regulatory  regime  depending  on the degree  of development  of the capital  market. On  the
other  hand,  countries  with a less  developed  capital  market  and little  tradition  in operating  private  pension
funds  may  justifiably  impose  more  rigorous  regulation. But in either  instance,  it is prudent  to establish
protective  regulations  in the same  vein  as rules  are applied  to banks  and  insurers.
An effective  supervisory  and regulatory  and framework  has been an essential  component  of
Chile's  privatized  pension  system.  This  seemed  to be a rational  approach  given:  (i) the compulsory  nature
of the private  pension;  (ii)  the lack  of knowledge  and  experience  among  contributing  workers  to investing
and the functioning  of capital  markets;  (iii)  the need to establish  a climate  of trust in a new system  to
create  political  acceptance  of a radically  reform  system; (iv)  the very limited  depth  of capital  markets  at
inception  of the system  and  relative  inexperience  in capital  market  developments;  (v) the need  to establish
safeguards  to  preclude investments  that jeopardize the  stability  of pension funds--for  which the
government  is ultimately  liable  if they  fail. Chile's  overall  success  has depended  crucially  on the structure
and implementation  of supervision.  This  has worked  well  because  of the independence  with which  such
functions  were carried  out; the effective  leadership  and  expert  staff  commensurate  with  the tasks at hand;
and  ample  resources  made  available  to undertake  the regulatory  and supervisory  functions.
As pension  systems  mature and as countries  gain experience  in the oversight  of such systems,
some relaxation  of regulations  may be appropriate. In the case of Chile,  there is some \evidence  to
suggest  that the regulation  of pension  funds  has  resulted  in disincentives  to competition  that could  result  in
lower  net returns. Impediments  to competition  include  restrictions  on competition  from domestic  banks,
mutual funds and insurance  companies.  In response,  Chile has relaxed the stringency  of its early
regulations  as it demonstrated  its ability  to enable  a privatized  pension  system  to work.
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As countries  in the region  consider  the design  of their  regulatory  system,  they  should  look to the
Chilean  approach  to  regulation 9. Strict regulation  is likely  to  be important  in the initial years of
implementing  a reformed  system.  At the same  time,  greater  flexibility  may  be warranted  at the outset,  e.g.
to permit  investment  in multiple  accounts  by the affliates as is the law in Mexico  and is now being
considered  in Chile. It may  be appropriate  likewise  to permit  well  rated  banks,  insurance  companies,  and
mutual  funds  to allow  their usual  products  such as deposit  accounts,  certificates  of deposits  and other
instruments  that receive  a high rating to be open for investment  affiliates  with the aim of engendering
competition  and giving  incentive  to pension  fund managers  to manage  their investments  with greater
efficiency  than  has been  the case  under  a more regulated  system. The precise  degree  of regulations  and
the phasing  of regulations  with varying  stringency  needs  to be based  on country  economic,  political,  and
other  structural  circumstances.
Regulations  need  to ensure  'fit  and  proper"  management  of pension  funds  which  requires  purview
over the principal  officials,  financial  solvency,  avoidance  of conflict  of interest,  custodial  safeguards  for
managed  assets,  information  disclosure,  and  fiduciary  responsibility.
Financing  the Transition
When fully  funded defined  contribution  systems  are put in place in pension  reform,  workers'
contributions  are placed  in individual  accounts. The cost of paying  the pensions  of current retirees
remains.  However,  major  issue  is  the manner  in which  these  transition  costs  will  be paid  and  who  will  pay
them. As noted earlier,  how this  is resolved  can have  very significant  macroeconomic  consequences.  A
related  issue  arises  when workers  who contributed  to the PAYG  system  and are now in the new system
have  less  in their  individual  accounts  that  those  who work  the same  number  of years  but solely  under  the
new system. A mechanism  used to recognize  and reward  and  individual's  right  in the old system  is the
recognition  bond for workers  used in Chile,  Colombia,  and Peru.  They  are valued  at the amount  that
workers  are owed  based  on the contributions  to the old system.  The  bonds  become  payable  at retirement
with individuals  converting  to an annuity  their accrued  funds,  and the principal  plus interest  from the
recognition  bonds.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS:  QUICK  FixEs OR  SUSTAINABLE  REFORM?
Demographic  changes  are yielding  a very significant  growth  in the aging  population.  By the year
2030, more than 16 percent of the world's  population  will be over age sixty,  compared  with 9 percent
today. This  changing  age structure  is the result  of improvements  in the standard  of living  as well as the
attainment  of better  health  status. These  successes,  though,  present  new  challenges  to providing  financial
security  to individuals  when  they  can  no longer  work  to support  themselves.  As a result,  pension  systems
in many countries are -- or will soon be -- in need of reform. Most of the present pension systems have
substantial  unfunded  liabilities  which  pose very  significant  financial  burdens  on future  generations  -- while
at the same time often providing  inadequate  protection  for older individuals  and for lower income
workers.
Pension  reform  is inevitable  because  of demographic  imperatives  and financial  unsustainability  of
many  public  systems.  Moreover,  the operation  of public  unfunded  pensions  is subject  to political  risk  that
arises  if promises  for future  retirees  cannot  be met. Reform  of pension  systems  is not only  technically  but
also  politically  complex.  The  good  news  is that  more  countries  are  beginning  to address  the problem.  The
larger  question,  though,  is whether  the reforms  that will eventually  be undertaken  will  be quick  fixes  or
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sustainable  changes  that will yield  benefits  to fuiture  generations  of older  individuals  and lower income
workers,  but also  bring  benefit  to the macroeconomy.  Quick  fixes  typically  involve  changes  in eligibility
such as retirement  age; changes  in the rate of contribution  or the population  of workers on which
contributions  are calculated,  or changes  in the structure  of benefits. These  changes  are typical  of many
pension  reforms  that are occurring  worldwide.
Countries  in the LAC  region,  though,  have  been  at the forefront  in comparison  to other  regions,  in
undertaking  major  reform  from  PAYG  defined  benefit  to fully  funded,  defined  contribution  pension  plans.
The success  of the Chilean  pension  model  has been  instrumental  in making  countries  in the LAC region
especially  prominent  in this area  both  in the number  of countries  that are  undertaking  reform  and  the depth
of reform.
Nonetheless  the need  for vigilance  remains  as some  of  the new pension  systems  are implemented.
The efficacy  of oversight,  the complementary  reforms  needed  namely  in the banking,  insurance  and the
securities  markets,  are critical  to the success  of pension  reform. Much  more  work needs  to be done or is
underway  in countries  in the LAC region  in these areas. But much  work has already  begun  to set the
region's  pension  systems  on the right  course.PENSIONREFORmINLATvNAmERICa  Page 21
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